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Psychological Challenges of Unification – Selected 
Results and Thoughts on Korea 
Rainer K. Silbereisen ∗ 
Abstract: »Psychologische Herausforderungen einer Politischen Vereinigung – 
Ausgewählte Ergebnisse und Anregungen für Korea«. A number of early warning 
signs for the break-down of a political system like North Korea are presented, in-
spired by recent research in psychological science. Taking post-unification Ger-
many as an exemplary case, the times soon after the turnabout and the mid2000s 
are considered in light of our own research. The focus is on the new challenges 
people were confronted with, which resources helped them to cope with strain 
and stress, and what all this meant for well-being. Concerning the 1990s, key 
drivers of behavior and its change were the changed institutions that resulted in 
rather quick adaptation to the new rules. Nevertheless, personal resources such as 
self-efficacy, gained under the old system, made a difference. In the 2000s, it was 
the uncertainties about life planning, rooted in the unification aftermath and ef-
fects of globalization and economic jeopardy, which shaped behavior. When con-
fronted with challenges, people typically responded by active engagement, and if 
supported by internal control beliefs this helped to protect well-being in spite of 
the difficult situation. Under especially dire circumstances, however, disengage-
ment was positive because it spares resources for alternative action. For the situa-
tion on the Korean Peninsula the German research results made plausible that 
policy interventions can use many entry points in the system of coping with so-
cial change, from opportunities to personal skills, to ease the challenges of living 
in a new country. Further, it demonstrates that a unification scenario inspired by 
the German model would require acculturation in both parts of the country, not 
only in the North. And finally, one has to consider lasting deficiencies in crucial 
agency factors due to growing up in an environment characterized by scarcity of 
adequate living conditions for large segments of the population. 
Keywords: German unification, political system change, challenges and demands, 
coping, role of opportunities and personal resources, young people, policy advice. 
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1.  Introduction1 
The question posed in this paper concerns what one can learn from research on 
German unification for the possible unification of the two Koreas (North, 
South). We refer to two lines of psychological research on youth and adults (up 
to 45 years of age) that were performed in the years following unification in 
1989 up to the mid-2000s. The aim was to understand the relationship between 
changes on the aggregate level of society and the behavior of people in this age 
range, especially in the former East of the country. The time from adolescence 
to young adulthood is of particular relevance because these age groups are 
known to be more flexible when facing social change compared to older peo-
ple. We confirmed this notion of “impressionable years” (Krosnick and Alwin 
1989) for the German situation by using period comparisons on basic value 
orientations over five years after the early 1990s. More specifically, the group of 
those aged 15 to 19 years and 20 to 24 years exhibited a remarkable reduction of 
the difference in values between the East and West of the country, whereas the 
group of those aged 25 to 29 years that had spent a decade or more working in the 
old system showed no difference at all. This convergence of basic value orienta-
tions, such as collectivism and individualism, among the younger groups mainly 
occurred in the former communist East, and it could be identified as due to an 
increase in individualistic orientations, the hallmark of the West (Reitzle and 
Silbereisen 2000a). Consequently, when thinking about possible political changes 
on the Korean Peninsula, paying special attention to our insights on young 
people under the influence of German unification seems justified.  
The question remains regarding whether German unification can at all con-
stitute a worthwhile experience when examining likely scenarios for Korea 
more than 20 years later, in a changed geopolitical situation and with extant 
cultural differences. Moreover, how unification was accomplished may be a 
unique case that cannot be easily generalized. It is worth noting that the back-
ground for the German model of unification, broadly considered, was the belief 
in a gap compared to the West in technological modernization and related 
governance organization. Consequently, the transformation mode was that of a 
shock-wise change to the social market economy and representative democracy 
with its many institutions, all orchestrated politically as Beitritt (accession) of 
the former East Germany to the Federal Republic of Germany (Zapf 1996), and 
supported by a strong pro-unification movement among the population in the 
East. Taking this as a blueprint for a potential Korean unification is only one of 
many possible scenarios. When reporting potentially relevant psychological 
insights in this paper, we have to keep this proposition always in mind. How-
ever, we believe that the results of unification-induced behavioral change that 
                                                             
1  I want to thank Michael Fritsch for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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we investigate can be applied to a range of political transitions and transfor-
mations and, when considered with caution, do indeed have relevance for Ko-
rea. One should not overlook, however, that the German model was problemat-
ic in many major respects, e.g., the changes in the economy resulted in tremen-
tremendous unemployment rates in the East, and the Angleichung (alignment) 
of life circumstances due to the transfer of Western institutions, even decades 
after unification, has still not been fully accomplished (Adler 2002).  
2.  Characteristics of Societal Change and Psychological 
Conditions 
Research on German unification is susceptible to a number of misconceptions 
about the influence of communism in the East, since knowledge of and access 
to the former East Germany was limited for so many years. Moreover, because 
the former East Germany was much less isolated and secretive than North 
Korea, some of these comparisons may be rejected by Korean political actors 
in their context. In addition, psychological thinking regarding the causes of 
social revolutions, such as in Germany and elsewhere, will be mentioned be-
cause it identifies specificities and commonalities with the possible Korean 
situation of system change in the North. 
2.1  Incorrect Assertions that Mislead Political Action  
The first incorrect assertion was the belief that, due to the desperate economic 
situation compared to the West of Germany, the one-sided political domination 
of many spheres of life and the environmental degradation due to outdated 
industrial plants, people suffered in their health and well-being, in general. 
More specifically, due to permanent “patronizing” by the authorities, they 
would exhibit low levels of self-efficacy, i.e., demonstrate little belief in their 
capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to manage 
prospective situations. In other words, they would be unable to exercise agen-
cy, with consequences for numerous important spheres of life, including health 
(Bandura 1995). However, this was not at all the case – contrary insights into 
widespread human resilience were overlooked (Bonanno 2008). In particular, a 
common split in many peoples’ minds was not recognized, between ritualized 
behavior in public life with little personal control, and behavior in the reclusive 
private domain, with its many opportunities for successful self-efficacy pro-
moting activities. It is plausible that North Korea may not be too different. 
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that the mass privatization charac-
teristic of many post-communist countries is known to increase mortality rates, 
especially when people lack social capital (Stuckler, King and McKee 2009). 
In addition, the North Korean population will have suffered from the many 
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economic hardships and associated ailments that are known to affect psychoso-
cial development of the next generation (Heberle and Carter 2015).   
The second incorrect assertion was the belief that differences between the 
two former countries were due to the different political regimes. In actuality, 
some dissimilarities, such as the divergence in marriage and cohabitation pat-
terns, represented old religious differences that had emerged over centuries. 
Moreover, the different responses to economic incentives across regions of the 
East were rooted in long-standing business traditions predating communism 
(Fritsch and Wyrwich 2014). The confrontation between the agrarian population 
in large parts of North Korea and the post-modern industrial population in the 
South during a process of political reconciliation may also highlight similar hid-
den traditions that should not be categorized as part of the communist legacy.  
The third incorrect assumption was that German unification would result in 
a quick alignment of living circumstances. This view ignored the fact that the 
mode of unification showed resemblances to migration, not of people, but of 
social institutions. Nevertheless, with this analogy in mind, any expectation of 
a quick and broad assimilation to the Western mold is unrealistic. On the one 
hand, as in real migration situations, it may take more than a generation to 
change culturally rooted behaviours beyond the pragmatics of everyday life 
that change quickly. On the other hand, people are not homogenous in their 
response to social change. For example, some groups may have been open to 
change already, and may acculturate smoothly when confronted with a flexible 
political transformation regime that acknowledges their prior life and achieve-
ments. In contrast, other people may already be skeptical of changes and, when 
confronted with a new system rigidly insisting on adherence to the new order 
and disregarding past achievements, may resist. Actually, the notions of the 
rigidity-flexibility of the system and the openness-resistance to change among 
people form a four-fold matrix, with more prototypical groups to be distin-
guished (Best 2007; Schmidt 2010). Overall, the political management of social 
change needs to acknowledge group differences and adjust to their needs. It is 
clear that Korea will possess its own particularities in this regard.  
2.2  Psychological Concepts Regarding the Causes of Political 
Transitions  
What does psychology have to say about the causes of social change, and how 
much can it tell us about the Korean situation and, in particular, the role of 
youth? There are certainly many approaches from other sciences that attempt to 
elucidate why and how a revolution gains momentum. However, for the emer-
gence of the potential growth of conflict, the “system justification approach” is 
helpful. As Kay and Friesen (2011) show, people in general exhibit the tenden-
cy to justify the existing political system against criticism, because it provides 
them with a framework of rules that provides them with a strong sense of secu-
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rity without requiring much mental processing. However, this only works if the 
system obviously has power, offers desirable career opportunities, has borders 
one cannot cross freely, and does not allow one to achieve control over one’s 
personal affairs.  
In the former communist East Germany, the potential for a threat to the sys-
tem increased gradually due to the economic downturn and its effects on daily 
life. Among many other issues, the key factor was the softening-up of borders, 
through travel arrangements for pensioners to the West, and by some opportu-
nities to resettle legally to the West, albeit with many bureaucratic difficulties. 
In addition, there was accessibility, although illicit, to Western television in 
most parts of the country. These factors undercut system loyalty, especially 
among young people, who foresaw a dim future. Political attempts at strength-
ening the relationship with them and their desire for Western youth culture 
failed – the invitation to pop stars from abroad (sometimes with ideological 
leanings towards the system) to assuage system-critical youth were actually 
seen by the public not as strength, but as another sign of the weakness of the 
system. An example of this is described by Kirschbaum (2013), based on files 
on the Bruce Springsteen concert kept by the secret police (Stasi) in the East 
and recovered after unification. 
In a sense, this is similar to North Korea, although at a lower level of con-
cern for the regime. There are a number of cautious reforms occurring concern-
ing the possibly positive effect of small businesses on the supply of food. How-
ever, this constitutes little danger to the system’s stability because the overall 
threat is high, the borders are closed, the dependency on provisions from the 
government is total, media from the outside are barred, and the number of 
refugees from the North is less than 2,000 per year (Am et al. 2012; Cho et al. 
2009). In other words, there is little opportunity to gain individual self-efficacy 
in public life other than by serving the system. Moreover, the development of 
collective self-efficacy (self-efficacy beliefs shared by a social group, such as 
in a civil movement) is virtually impossible. Furthermore, reactance to the 
system, rather than system rationalization, is unlikely because there are no 
educated middle classes, in the Western sense, that are known to have formed 
or support humanitarian movements (Laurin, Kay and Fitzsimons 2012). The 
total blockage of news from the outside is incomplete, however, particularly 
due to illegal CD trade of South Korean entertainment programs through the 
Chinese border to North Korea.  
At this point, a note on psychological research addressing the situation in 
North Korea is in order. The simple answer is – there is not much. A systematic 
search in the comprehensive data archive Psycinfo resulted in about 110 en-
tries, many representing empirical studies. There were a few distinct topics 
among them. First, research on South Korean attitudes toward North Korea 
revealed an overall negative evaluation (Ha 2013). Second, there was a sub-
stantial component of research on mental health among North Korean defectors 
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to the South. An interesting result of a longitudinal study revealed that it was 
the combined effect of past trauma experienced in the North and current cultur-
al stress (not stress due to ordinary life events) in the South that endangered 
mental health, but not stress during defection (Jeon, Eom and Min 2013). 
Third, childhood malnutrition was also a topic of research, using UNICEF data 
gathered in the country. It showed wide stunting (reduced growth rate) of de-
velopment among children and, interestingly, this was less severe in the better 
supplied capital Pyongyang, with its residential concentration of the political 
elite (Schwekendiek 2010, 2014). Fourth, studies referred to the economic 
“reform from below,” meaning the promotion of small businesses. However, it 
had little political or economic effect (other than what might be expected based 
on literature on entrepreneurship), except for concerns about possibly increas-
ing social inequality (Haggard and Noland 2010). Taken together, these kinds 
of studies could not contribute to the topics that are central in this chapter. 
Consequently, in the remainder, I report the results of my own research, always 
with a consideration of the Korean situation. 
3.  Select Research on the Effects of Social Change in 
Germany  
As indicated by our research and in line with the extant literature, the quintes-
sential experience of people undergoing a radical system transition and trans-
formation are great new “uncertainties” about basically all aspects of life. For 
example, what does an open society mean, how should one train under the new 
conditions for an occupation, what is necessary to secure a consumer loan, how 
to choose between many competing sales options, and what is one’s identity in 
the new country? Such uncertainties are especially relevant when they consti-
tute major developmental tasks of the age groups considered, such as how to 
establish a career or how to form a family of one’s own, i.e., tasks that most 
people need to resolve.  
In the following, select results of two independent, but complementary, lines 
of research are reported. Comprehensive overviews on both have been pub-
lished elsewhere, such as in Silbereisen, Reitzle and Juang (2002), and Sil-
bereisen, Pinquart and Tomasik (2010).  
The first line of research refers to the time of German unification and a few 
years after, i.e., into the mid-1990s. This was the period in which everything 
was new, and existing obstacles related directly to the recent political and eco-
nomic system transformation. The case in point comprises changes of im-
portant life-course transitions in the early decades of life. The second line of 
research addresses the situation in the mid-2000s, when the post-unification 
achievements and remaining disadvantages were overshadowed by the conse-
quences of globalization and the economic crisis that particularly affected 
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transforming countries all across Europe. These brought a range of new uncer-
tainties that people had not expected to face under democratic rule, such as new 
economic shocks or new waves of migration. Here, I focus on how people until 
mid-adulthood dealt with the new challenges emerging in the broader societal 
context. The common denominator of the research reported is an attempt to 
elucidate how the manifestations of the change on the macro-level of the politi-
cal and economic system likely affected individuals’ behaviour and develop-
ment, as well as by what means people attempted to cope with the challenges 
and adjust successfully. Throughout this work, hypotheses and other references 
to Korea are added when appropriate. Although the two research lines refer to 
historically different periods, when taken together, their relevance to today’s 
Korea may be obvious.  
3.1  Reorganizing Life-Course and Agency in the 1990s  
The life of young people is organized by a series of developmental tasks (or 
biographical transitions) that are usually resolved in a sequential order. It typi-
cally starts with physical changes during puberty, then the establishment of 
new relations to peers and romantic contacts, followed by the initial formation of 
plans concerning school and occupation, and finally the transition from school to 
work or further education. Individuals may differ in the timing of the transitions, 
and the “clock” behind the timing and the variation comprises a combination of 
biological maturation, expectations from society, and personal aspirations 
(Dekovic, Noom and Meuus 1996). German unification brought with it a change 
of societal institutions, such as the school system and its curricula that had a 
major influence on education-related developmental tasks. We revealed this by 
comparing young people in both parts of the country, assessed in 1991, soon after 
unification when East German conditions were still prevalent. This work was 
repeated by us in 1996, with independent but equivalent samples, several years 
into unification, with the newly formed or reformed institutions being opera-
tional, and after the occurrence of the first shocks due to rising unemployment.  
Concerning occupational development, our prediction was that, in 1991, the 
timing was earlier in the East due to the fact that a smaller range of occupations 
was available, and there was a lot of “sponsoring” by the state that encouraged 
people to enter particular professions that were deemed to be relevant for the 
economy. In 1996, however, changes in the school system had taken place, 
with different branches of schools (vocational, academic) dominating instead of 
the comprehensive form of school that was common in the former East. As 
expected, the timing in 1996 in the East was later than in 1991, now compara-
ble to the West with its greater freedom of choice and more responsibility for 
the young. In the West, on the other hand, there was no difference between the 
two time periods (Silbereisen 2000), indicating that no institutional changes 
had taken place.  
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The pertinent question is whether such differences indeed reflect the pulse 
of unification-related changes. The answer is an unqualified “yes.” In contrast 
to the transitions mentioned, not surprisingly, the timing of puberty during 
adolescence did not differ between the periods and countries, implicitly reveal-
ing that not unexpectedly the living conditions in the East were sufficient for 
the requirements of the biological potential of maturation. Among young 
adults, we found a number of differences in transition timing, reflecting the 
change in the societal situation. For instance, the timing of leaving home was 
later in 1996 in the East, due to the fact that forming a family of one’s own no 
longer provided the advantage of gaining preferred access to an apartment in 
this country, with its highly regulated housing market (Juang, Silbereisen and 
Wiesner 1999). Likewise, the postponing of occupational decisions that we 
found among the young was reflected in a later timing of financial independ-
ence among young adults, again comparing 1991 and 1996, but only among 
those with a vocational, instead of an academic, background. This group was 
severely affected by the economic challenges (Reitzle and Silbereisen 2000b). 
Concerning romantic engagements, we observed no difference between the 
East and West in both periods. Concerning family formation, however, the 
timing in the East in 1996 was later than in 1991, now similar to the West. This 
is due to the fact that the labor market was tighter and there was less support 
available for childrearing in the new Germany (Juang and Silbereisen 2001).  
The results reported support the view that a close relationship exists between 
the societal changes and the organization of the life course. Throughout all of the 
results, a general observation holds, i.e., those belonging to the lower stratum of 
education were in a more precarious situation with regard to many developmental 
tasks compared to the others. This is probably related to the fact that the decline 
of traditional industrial labor after unification largely eliminated the availability 
of types of employment to which they had previously been accustomed.  
The fact that the timing of those life-course transitions influenced by institu-
tional arrangements obviously differed when the countries were still separated, 
whereas the timing of transitions mainly under other influences, such as puberty 
and hormonal maturation, were alike, may indicate that the case cannot be com-
pared fully to Korea. The deficiencies of nutrition in the North (Schwekendiek 
2010, 2014) represent conditions that are known to influence the timing of puber-
ty, although whether it is earlier or later (more likely) than otherwise is an issue 
of debate (Delemarre-van de Waal, van Coeverden and Engelbregt 2002). 
Given that there are many intermediate contexts between changes on the ag-
gregate level of a society and the proximate everyday behaviours and expecta-
tions of people, the relationship between levels is certainly not a direct one. 
This assertion is supported by the sometimes longer time that it takes for socie-
tal changes to affect individuals’ behaviour, i.e., a so-called “loose coupling” 
(Elder and O’Rand 1995). This view led us to attempt to identify some of the 
mechanisms that link the levels. In the situation soon after German unification, 
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many families were affected by concerns about the security of their (former) 
public housing at low rents, or family members had to undergo re-training 
because their qualifications had become obsolete. Other examples are one’s or 
a family member’s unemployment or the discontinuation of an apprenticeship. 
Using the example of our data on financial self-support, results for the age 
group of 20 to 29 years revealed that about one-third of the timing difference 
between 1991 and 1996 could be “explained away” by these conditions of 
family life. Certainly, this is not the only mechanism connecting social change 
and individual behaviour. In addition, although there may be different mecha-
nisms for other biographical transitions, it reveals the relevance of unification-
related changes in life-circumstances for behavioural adjustment.  
What do these results on the post-unification situation mean for possible fu-
ture scenarios occurring on the Korean Peninsula? It is remarkable that, in 
Germany, five years were enough to change the organization of the life course 
in areas crucial for the new societal order, such as the development of an occu-
pational identity. Furthermore, it took people from the East more time than in 
earlier periods to gain independence in various sectors of life. This “moratori-
um” offered additional time for learning and adjustment to a situation of higher 
self-responsibility, and it also extended the duration of adolescence and 
“emerging adulthood.” This period is characterized by full physical maturation, 
but lacks social independence. It is thus known to be prone to status offenses, 
meaning that people often try to achieve autonomy through peer-oriented illicit 
actions, such as taking psychoactive substances (Moffitt 1993). In Korea, after 
unification, a similar quick adaptation of major life course transitions is a likely 
consequence of the probable change of social institutions, including the nega-
tive side effects just mentioned.  
Socio-demographic circumstances, such as age or unemployment, are not 
the only source of differences in individuals’ responses to new challenges 
following a transformation of the political system. For example, a major role is 
played by personality differences. Of particular interest is self-efficacy, a vari-
able that describes tendencies to believe in one’s capabilities to control the 
results of one’s own actions and to exert overall optimism in being able to deal 
with challenges (Bandura 1995). One can gain self-efficacy and the related 
self-regulatory competences by various means. The foremost one is success in 
overcoming obstacles through persistent efforts under one’s own control, i.e., 
personal mastery experiences. Other means include vicarious experiences taken 
from social models of exercising self-efficacy, and persuasion by significant 
others that one has reason to believe in one’s capabilities and thereby overcome 
self-doubts. In a communist system with overarching control by authorities 
over almost all aspects of life, such self-regulated mastery experiences are 
often achieved in the private domain only.  
We were fortunate to have access to a unique longitudinal study that began at 
the age of 12 years in a large East German city and, after unification, was fol-
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lowed-up into early adulthood. Pinquart, Silbereisen and Juang (2004) found an 
effect of earlier self-efficacy on post-unification life satisfaction and future opti-
mism at age 18, itself a harbinger of life success. Furthermore, self-efficacy buff-
ered unification-related deteriorations concerning family finances, occupational 
training, and leisure opportunities in their effect on life satisfaction – the rela-
tionship was less close if self-efficacy during childhood was high. In other 
words, self-efficacy can shield the unification-related loss of social capital from 
affecting future life-satisfaction, and thus constitutes a source of resilience.  
What do such results imply for the debate on Korea? A probably valid view 
is that higher self-efficacy corresponds to greater willingness and competence 
to deal constructively with the individual challenges of unification affecting the 
North. It is important to note, however, that self-efficacy cannot last forever, 
i.e., it needs occasional renewals through new successes in the new system, and 
this requires responsible social policies that provide opportunities to exercise 
mastery. Obviously, low self-efficacy is not an exclusively personal problem 
that simply requires personal change. Rather, the social system in which people 
live may have impeded opportunities for the promotion of self-efficacy. Thus, 
in order to induce self-efficacy, change has to occur there first. Finally, one 
might wonder whether cultural differences between Germany and Korea pre-
clude a generalization regarding self-efficacy and its consequences. This is not 
so, however, since self-efficacy plays an equivalent role in individualistic 
(Germany) and collectivist (Korea) cultures. In the former, it contributes to 
self-directedness, and in the latter it contributes to group-directedness in over-
coming obstacles. The common denominator is that people attempt to achieve 
benefits through their own actions, whether for the individual or the social 
group (Bandura 1995).  
After this examination of the biographical adjustments that the young people 
experienced under the influence of changed social institutions during the pro-
cess of German unification, and some of the most prominent psychological 
prerequisites, in the following, perceived uncertainties particularly affecting the 
domain of work and career will be discussed, and how people tried to over-
come them depending on personal competences and contextual opportunities.  
3.2  Dealing with the Challenges of the mid-2000s 
In the first decade of the new millennium, we had the opportunity to look more 
closely at various uncertainties that people perceive vis-à-vis ongoing social 
change and how they deal with them. This was no longer the immediate situa-
tion after unification, but instead a time when unification had begun to settle. 
However, at the same time, Germany, like other transforming countries in 
Europe, was severely affected by the negative consequences of globalization, 
including the financial shocks in the middle of the decade. Large samples for 
East and West Germany in the age range of 15 to 45 years were gathered. In 
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addition, for reasons of generalization, the same design was used in collecting a 
sample from Poland. Our earlier research experience was instructive for a con-
ceptual model of the research that focused on, as manifestations of social 
change, new demands (uncertainties) and new benefits concerning major de-
velopmental tasks in work and family. It further addresses ways of coping and 
the role of personal resources when dealing with the demands, and the conse-
quences of the process on psychosocial well-being, antecedent to further posi-
tive achievements in life. As depicted in Figure 1, this Jena Model of Social 
Change and Human Development presumes complex direct and indirect rela-
tions between the four elements mentioned, reminiscent of psychological and 
sociological theories addressing how people deal with stressful encounters, 
rooted in changes to a deteriorated opportunity structure, such as aggravated 
economic hardship (Elder 1994; Conger and Donellan 2007). The Jena Model 
is also characterized by the assumption that all of the cognitive-motivational 
processes are embedded in multiple layers of ecological contexts, from the 
belief systems at the political superstructure over intermediate contexts repre-
sented by social institutions, to the proximal context of the neighbourhoods, 
and finally the micro-context of the family. The idea here is that social change 
“cascades down” from the societal level to the individual through altering these 
contexts. In this regard, the Jena Model was informed by the results of our 
1990s post-unification research. 
Figure 1: Jena Model of Social Change and Human Development (changed 
after Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2014) 
 
 
Interestingly, some research addressing social change in South Korea chose a 
similar starting point, which is somewhat equivalent to the demands in the Jena 
Model. For example, Kim (2008) assessed subjective appraisals of the extent, 
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pace, and evaluation of (negative) change in various domains, such as politics 
and the economy. In contrast to our approach, however, the instances of change 
refer to the society at large, and not to the individual experiences of negative 
change, as in our case. We assessed perceived change over a period of time 
concerning work (labour market, work place, career development), and family 
(relationship stability, life’s directions, ambivalence in family formation). All 
of the topics were chosen based on theories and facts regarding the conse-
quence of globalization, economic change, and demographic shifts in the mid-
2000s in Germany (Tomasik and Silbereisen 2009).  
As the results revealed, the “load” of such demands (number of highly en-
dorsed respective statements) was reflective of the objective situation in the re-
gion concerning official statistics, and it also identified the protection of “filters,” 
such as employment, marriage/cohabitation and higher education, that provided 
more resources. Furthermore, and not surprisingly, demand loads were higher in 
the still less prosperous former East Germany. Moreover, longitudinal data 
showed that the course of demand loads across time resembled that of relevant 
social indicators (e.g., unemployment rates) on the aggregate level. Obviously, 
the demands are a subjective reflection of the larger picture in the society.  
Concerning people’s coping with the demands representing two major de-
velopmental tasks, following Heckhausen, Wrosch and Schulz (2010), we 
distinguish between engagement (actively facing challenges; rallying motiva-
tion; and, in the case of failure, alternative plans of action) and disengagement 
(face-saving attributions or withdrawal, perhaps for better alternatives later on). 
It was found that engagement was always higher than disengagement, reflect-
ing a cultural habit in achievement-oriented societies, and that engagement was 
especially high in the former East of the country, probably induced by the 
higher demand load. This finding was in contrast to the public stereotype, and 
may be informative for a future scenario in Korea, as well (Tomasik, Silberei-
sen, Lechner and Wasilewski 2013).  
Engagement helped to preserve well-being that otherwise was negatively as-
sociated with demands, i.e., the uncertainties indeed functioned as stressors, as 
we had expected. This effect was stronger, the more that engagement was com-
bined with a sense of control (disengagement in the opposite way) – a result 
that is reminiscent of the effects of self-efficacy in the 1990s (Gruemer, Sil-
bereisen and Heckhausen 2013; Koerner, Silbereisen and Cantner 2015).  
After this short overview demonstrating that social-change related demands 
require engagement to avoid negative effects on well-being, in the following, a 
quintessential feature of our approach will be addressed, i.e., the role of ecolog-
ical contexts in dealing with demands. For that purpose, we compared Germa-
ny and Poland, and also political-administrative regions within these countries. 
The comparison across countries revealed that appraisals of the demands as 
challenge versus threat and gain versus loss were relevant in Germany, but not 
in Poland (Lechner, Tomasik and Silbereisen 2014). We interpreted this as a 
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consequence of the less generous welfare regime in Poland that does not allow 
“thinking twice” before dealing with the demands. In 2007, Germany spent 
about 27% of GDP, whereas Poland spent about 18%, for public health, pen-
sions, and other forms of welfare (OECD 2014). 
We also examined exploration, a personal disposition to scrutinize contexts 
and embrace novelty. The idea here was that only higher exploration would 
help people to actualize the potential in the environment in coping with mani-
festations of social change. This “reaping” was demonstrated by showing that 
those higher in exploration reported experiencing more benefits of social change. 
This was especially so if they lived in regions that offered opportunities – in this 
case indexed by a higher divorce rate, conveying more liberal attitudes and higher 
Internet domain registration rates, signaling access to modern technologies. Ob-
viously, personality constitutes an important resource in dealing with social 
change, but particularly so if there are relevant instigations available in the ecolo-
gy. This moderation is certainly relevant for Korea because it demonstrates that 
trusting in personal strength is not enough. Specifically, it also requires ade-
quate environments, which need to be developed and supported by policy in-
tervention (Lechner, Obschonka and Silbereisen, forthcoming).  
A final part of this work brings together all of the conditions identified in the 
Jena Model. We showed that work demands were negatively associated with 
well-being, and that engagement had positive effects. This applies overall, but 
when examined more closely, it is found that the association was less (!) negative 
if people lived in regions with a high unemployment rate. At first glance, this 
“social norm” or “downward comparison” effect is good news, because it shields 
people from the possibly negative effects of the ecology. Upon closer inspection, 
however, it may have a negative effect in the longer term, i.e., those affected by 
demands may avoid overcoming the obstacles because the comparison with 
others makes them feel inadequately comfortable (Pinquart, Silbereisen and 
Koerner 2009, 2010). In addition, we showed that, when living in very poor 
environments, disengagement, rather than engagement, may have a positive 
effect on well-being, demonstrating that successfully dealing with social 
change necessitates flexibility (Tomasik and Silbereisen 2012).  
4.  Conclusion 
The imminent failure of a political system, indicated by a rapid decline in the 
provision for satisfying personal strivings and empowering collective life, often 
exhibits early warnings, such as hesitant attempts at economic liberalization 
combined with actions taken to maintain power through threats. If perceived as 
evidence of diminishing control, people will experience a mixture of new hopes 
and old concerns, but also feel a growing agency to challenge the system. The 
first almost indiscernible decline in loyalty may constitute the beginning of a 
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cascade of effects that, in the end, can overwhelm the old powers. Although 
accurately predicting the “tipping point” is difficult, opportunities for exchange 
between peoples and ideas from other countries are crucial. In this regard, the 
political system of North Korea may be protected in its existence for quite 
some time, in spite of its obvious deficiencies in supplying even the most basic 
needs of its population.  
In this report, first, I addressed insights concerning the time soon after and a 
few years into German unification (1990s). They mainly referred to changes in 
the timing of important biographical transitions and relevant resources when 
confronting the societal changes. Second, I reported on how people dealt with 
the many new demands resulting from ongoing social change a decade and 
more after unification, in the 2000s, due to the effects of globalization and 
economic shocks.  
As our research demonstrated, the main driver of rapid change in dissolution 
of a system is the alteration or replacement of social institutions that function 
as “pacemakers” in resolving developmental tasks, such as preparing for an 
occupation. This drives even adjacent cohorts apart, depending on their biograph-
ical status when the social change occurred. Those who finished their education 
just prior to unification may have trained for now obsolete professions, whereas 
those who finished later had time to adapt. Moreover, not everybody is affected 
to the same degree, i.e., it depends on social capital resources (that often become 
diminished through the transition and transformation), and on personal attributes 
gained already in the past, such as self-efficacy and other personality attributes. 
The factors that connect change on the aggregate level with individual adapta-
tion are the intermediate contexts and related experiences, and this also ex-
plains why social change often needs time to actually affect people and change 
their behavior.  
According to our results on the lives of people in the 2000s, uncertainties 
about the chance to resolve major developmental tasks in an era of globaliza-
tion are the most dominant psychological features, with major consequences 
for well-being. Particularly, if accumulated, uncertainties convey the devalua-
tion of past achievements and resources, and affect personal pride. Taken to-
gether, they constitute a major source of stress. Nevertheless, even under such 
conditions, people tend to engage actively in resolving the uncertainties. More-
over, if they are able to bring a positive sense of control in congruence with the 
engagement, the otherwise negative effects on well-being are minimized. Alt-
hough in general not adequate, disengagement from the uncertainties, if used in 
circumstances of radically diminished resources, can be positive.  
For the Korean Peninsula, two main insights of our research are probably 
relevant. First, the complex interplay of uncertainties, coping, sense of control 
and other personal endowments, and contextual opportunities for economic, 
social and cultural strivings in the regional context, provide multiple entry 
points for scaffolding policy interventions. Fostering “agency” (engagement, 
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initiative, self-efficacy, etc.) is a means to strengthen resilience and productivi-
ty under conditions of radical social change. Depending on the age of the peo-
ple affected, this means educational interventions or change of work conditions 
and qualifications. The new social institutions in the North after a political 
change should provide scripts for adequate individual and collective behaviours 
to secure one’s future in a democratic society. Our psychological research 
demonstrated institutions’ power in influencing behavior, which constitutes a 
potent resource that should be fully utilized. Instead of blaming individuals for 
their possible ineffectiveness in adapting to the changed circumstances, institu-
tional reforms should be seen as a responsibility of all levels of government. In 
the German situation, positive experiences were achieved through establishing 
a model of institutionalized self-government in the former East, providing 
room for local and regional autonomy (Holtmann and Rademacher 2016, in this 
HSR Forum). From a psychological perspective, this is likely to be especially 
critical for the development of individual and collective self-efficacy.  
Second, it is important to note that unification has much in common with 
migration, although it is institutions, and not people, that move. In such situa-
tions, people experience a conflict between their wish to retain what they were 
used to and may have appreciated, and their desire to adapt to new expectations 
and promises for a good life in the future. Regarding results of research on 
acculturation, the style of encounters called “integration” is often viewed as 
prerequisite for future life success, meaning a simultaneous retaining of former 
traditions and successful adjustment to the new circumstance. In reality, how-
ever, especially soon after the dissolution of the system, both new citizens from 
the North and the receiving society from the South will likely expect assimila-
tion, i.e., low retaining and high adjustment. As in the case of Germany, segre-
gation (high retaining, low adjustment) or marginalization (low retaining, low 
adjustment) may also exist to a substantial extent (Berry 2005). Wisdom is 
required from the political elite in the South to recognize that, in order to 
achieve a unified Korea, both former countries would actually need to change. 
For this reason, assimilation should not be the preferred mode. In Germany, it 
also took a long period of time before this simple truth was widely accepted. 
Moreover, as the resemblance to migration indicates, one needs patience for a 
process that will ultimately take a generation or more to complete.  
A final comment on the particular situation in North Korea – all of the agen-
cy factors deemed relevant regarding our research on the German unification 
situation may be limited among larger segments of the population, due to se-
vere childhood adversities based on malnutrition. These are known to greatly 
diminish certain important capabilities, such as sense of control. Such experi-
ences may not be overly relevant under sufficient conditions for human devel-
opment, but may be crucial when confronted in the emerging new Korea, with 
severe uncertainties in adolescence and adulthood, especially in the North. 
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